The following pages link to Shahar Dobzinski (Q414843):
Displaying 41 items.
- Multi-unit auctions with budget limits (Q765207) (← links)
- Is Shapley cost sharing optimal? (Q1651261) (← links)
- Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect (Q2100637) (← links)
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts (Q2253831) (← links)
- Economic efficiency requires interaction (Q2278948) (← links)
- Optimization with demand oracles (Q2414860) (← links)
- Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms (Q2454572) (← links)
- Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders (Q2516248) (← links)
- (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (Q2667262) (← links)
- Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms (Q2884315) (← links)
- Shared Resource Management via Reward Schemes (Q2938649) (← links)
- Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents (Q3093628) (← links)
- Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders (Q3169079) (← links)
- Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations (Q3177762) (← links)
- Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium (Q3460797) (← links)
- (Q3549630) (← links)
- Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders (Q3581408) (← links)
- An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders (Q3581517) (← links)
- Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions (Q3603458) (← links)
- A Modular Approach to Roberts’ Theorem (Q3648839) (← links)
- Faster and Simpler Sketches of Valuation Functions (Q4962671) (← links)
- Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders (Q4997307) (← links)
- Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets (Q5167758) (← links)
- On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Q5171216) (← links)
- Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions (Q5190267) (← links)
- The communication complexity of local search (Q5212806) (← links)
- Economic efficiency requires interaction (Q5259557) (← links)
- On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions (Q5363024) (← links)
- On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Q5408767) (← links)
- From query complexity to computational complexity (Q5415538) (← links)
- Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy (Q5419082) (← links)
- An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations (Q5419083) (← links)
- Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions (Q5459982) (← links)
- Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal? (Q5459997) (← links)
- Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations (Q5741796) (← links)
- (Q5743455) (← links)
- Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (Q5891528) (← links)
- Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (Q5891931) (← links)
- (Q6126288) (← links)
- Combinatorial reallocation mechanisms (Q6130328) (← links)
- Rigidity in mechanism design and its applications (Q6610310) (← links)
