Pages that link to "Item:Q4198284"
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The following pages link to Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains (Q4198284):
Displayed 38 items.
- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity (Q427512) (← links)
- Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency (Q427528) (← links)
- Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem (Q431230) (← links)
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation (Q532676) (← links)
- Group strategyproofness in queueing models (Q536097) (← links)
- Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects (Q656802) (← links)
- Asymptotic efficiency of the pivotal mechanism with general project space (Q787834) (← links)
- Incentive compatibility and informational requirements (Q795694) (← links)
- Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems (Q844925) (← links)
- Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work? (Q863276) (← links)
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities (Q868214) (← links)
- On robust constitution design (Q885072) (← links)
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect (Q926207) (← links)
- Labour market recruiting with intermediaries (Q934973) (← links)
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations (Q946368) (← links)
- Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms (Q969531) (← links)
- Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers (Q976966) (← links)
- Fair Groves mechanisms (Q1038707) (← links)
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition (Q1090218) (← links)
- Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism (Q1173509) (← links)
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence (Q1184840) (← links)
- Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive (Q1290837) (← links)
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types (Q1371183) (← links)
- Manipulation through bribes (Q1572941) (← links)
- Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems (Q1776969) (← links)
- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy (Q1804641) (← links)
- Service capacity decision and incentive compatible cost allocation for reporting usage forecasts (Q1877034) (← links)
- On the fastest Vickrey algorithm (Q1957643) (← links)
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation (Q1973452) (← links)
- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle (Q2268126) (← links)
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms (Q2268363) (← links)
- Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism (Q2268895) (← links)
- Mixed bundling auctions (Q2373786) (← links)
- Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction (Q2385108) (← links)
- Core-selecting package auctions (Q2482666) (← links)
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods (Q2505520) (← links)
- Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation (Q2573267) (← links)
- House allocation with transfers (Q5958896) (← links)