The following pages link to Dolors Berga (Q423714):
Displaying 18 items.
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient? (Q423715) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences (Q1296477) (← links)
- Immunity to credible deviations from the truth (Q1680109) (← links)
- Stability and voting by committees with exit (Q1762858) (← links)
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results (Q1938825) (← links)
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? (Q1958948) (← links)
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good (Q1976440) (← links)
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models (Q2078029) (← links)
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel (Q2179463) (← links)
- Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness (Q2209557) (← links)
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model (Q2248911) (← links)
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences (Q2272186) (← links)
- Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness (Q2311174) (← links)
- An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit (Q2384877) (← links)
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences (Q2450079) (← links)
- On exiting after voting (Q2491086) (← links)
- Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes (Q2567906) (← links)
- Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain (Q6168822) (← links)
