The following pages link to Jordi Massó (Q427507):
Displaying 50 items.
- The division problem with voluntary participation (Q427509) (← links)
- On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria (Q472191) (← links)
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness (Q550194) (← links)
- The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model (Q617603) (← links)
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency (Q683523) (← links)
- Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem (Q700081) (← links)
- On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles (Q765218) (← links)
- Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions (Q892978) (← links)
- Matching markets under (in)complete information (Q894021) (← links)
- Weighted approval voting (Q926234) (← links)
- (Q1272624) (redirect page) (← links)
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges (Q1272626) (← links)
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues (Q1368881) (← links)
- Voting under constraints (Q1371133) (← links)
- The Chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games (Q1396932) (← links)
- An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings. (Q1431789) (← links)
- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings (Q1566906) (← links)
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness (Q1704055) (← links)
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem (Q1762856) (← links)
- Stability and voting by committees with exit (Q1762858) (← links)
- On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model (Q1764287) (← links)
- Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model (Q1811552) (← links)
- A note on reputation: more on the chain-store paradox (Q1816396) (← links)
- More on the `anti-folk theorem' (Q1825777) (← links)
- The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria (Q1935950) (← links)
- Salvador Barberà (Q2064129) (← links)
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness (Q2212751) (← links)
- On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good (Q2254034) (← links)
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness (Q2295829) (← links)
- On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game (Q2336206) (← links)
- The division problem under constraints (Q2345235) (← links)
- Equilibrium payoffs of dynamic games (Q2365093) (← links)
- Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players (Q2366715) (← links)
- An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit (Q2384877) (← links)
- Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes (Q2386317) (← links)
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets (Q2455677) (← links)
- Bribe-proof rules in the division problem (Q2462290) (← links)
- Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (Q2463787) (← links)
- On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles (Q2482670) (← links)
- Voting by committees under constraints (Q2485953) (← links)
- On exiting after voting (Q2491086) (← links)
- Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences (Q2519487) (← links)
- Corrigendum to: ``On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness'' (Q2667286) (← links)
- Notes on a new compromisw value: the<sub>x</sub>-value<sup>†</sup> (Q2785405) (← links)
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model<sup>∗</sup> (Q4531544) (← links)
- Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability (Q4586044) (← links)
- ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS (Q4634427) (← links)
- (Q4920860) (← links)
- (Q5373693) (← links)
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof (Q6076917) (← links)
