The following pages link to Ron Lavi (Q433726):
Displaying 28 items.
- A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets (Q433728) (← links)
- Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals (Q480844) (← links)
- Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem (Q733788) (← links)
- Multi-unit auctions with budget limits (Q765207) (← links)
- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity (Q834857) (← links)
- Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security (Q1783457) (← links)
- Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions (Q1884971) (← links)
- Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations (Q2021787) (← links)
- Principal-agent VCG contracts (Q2138089) (← links)
- Bayesian generalized network design (Q2202025) (← links)
- Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items (Q2253832) (← links)
- Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case (Q2276546) (← links)
- Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms (Q2884315) (← links)
- (Q2921788) (← links)
- Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness (Q3161816) (← links)
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation (Q3418482) (← links)
- Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies (Q3452198) (← links)
- (Q3524721) (← links)
- Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies (Q3583422) (← links)
- Job security, stability, and production efficiency (Q4682751) (← links)
- (Q5075788) (← links)
- Deterministic Leader Election in Programmable Matter (Q5092343) (← links)
- Approximating Generalized Network Design under (Dis)economies of Scale with Applications to Energy Efficiency (Q5133963) (← links)
- Mechanism Design (Q5149740) (← links)
- Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation (Q5154768) (← links)
- STACS 2004 (Q5309699) (← links)
- Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming (Q5395669) (← links)
- Technical Note—Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency (Q6198743) (← links)
