Pages that link to "Item:Q4530990"

The following pages link to Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange (Q4530990):

Displaying 50 items.

• Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions (Q281343) (← links)
• Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics (Q290170) (← links)
• Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems (Q308625) (← links)
• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles (Q372362) (← links)
• Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods (Q402062) (← links)
• Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient? (Q423715) (← links)
• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods (Q431227) (← links)
• The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects (Q449183) (← links)
• Automated reasoning in social choice theory: some remarks (Q475377) (← links)
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles (Q496872) (← links)
• A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets (Q498757) (← links)
• On the operation of multiple matching markets (Q516981) (← links)
• Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems (Q532646) (← links)
• Strategy-proof coalition formation (Q532687) (← links)
• Corrigendum to ``Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems'' (Q548066) (← links)
• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Q639889) (← links)
• On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable (Q656783) (← links)
• Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents (Q682470) (← links)
• Non-bossiness (Q682486) (← links)
• Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation (Q697840) (← links)
• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems (Q700121) (← links)
• Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects (Q722621) (← links)
• Influence in private-goods allocation (Q776963) (← links)
• Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants (Q776969) (← links)
• Pairwise kidney exchange (Q813943) (← links)
• Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket (Q836923) (← links)
• Constrained school choice (Q840677) (← links)
• Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? (Q840694) (← links)
• Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain (Q859595) (← links)
• Consistent house allocation (Q868626) (← links)
• Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods (Q869861) (← links)
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values (Q896937) (← links)
• Decomposing random mechanisms (Q898659) (← links)
• Centralized allocation in multiple markets (Q898664) (← links)
• Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness (Q926330) (← links)
• Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms (Q969481) (← links)
• Efficient assignment respecting priorities (Q972883) (← links)
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization (Q980969) (← links)
• The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments (Q980972) (← links)
• Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes (Q1005762) (← links)
• Random assignment under weak preferences (Q1021614) (← links)
• Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness (Q1028549) (← links)
• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q1036602) (← links)
• Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments. (Q1411037) (← links)
• Consistency in house allocation problems (Q1576474) (← links)
• Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application (Q1633670) (← links)
• Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted (Q1642176) (← links)
• Competitive equilibria in school assignment (Q1651277) (← links)
• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities (Q1691346) (← links)
• Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable (Q1729671) (← links)