Pages that link to "Item:Q4585991"
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The following pages link to Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability (Q4585991):
Displaying 15 items.
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market (Q894069) (← links)
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money (Q896943) (← links)
- Divide and compromise (Q1680104) (← links)
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets (Q1684134) (← links)
- An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy (Q1704408) (← links)
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research (Q1982858) (← links)
- A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget (Q2171847) (← links)
- Manipulability in school choice (Q2231403) (← links)
- Sharing an increase of the rent fairly (Q2362195) (← links)
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities (Q2453827) (← links)
- Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division (Q5868945) (← links)
- An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities (Q6074887) (← links)
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents (Q6076915) (← links)
- Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences (Q6105150) (← links)
- Equitable rent division on a soft budget (Q6160054) (← links)
