Pages that link to "Item:Q4586042"

The following pages link to Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games (Q4586042):

Displaying 50 items.

• Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion (Q337818) (← links)
• Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution (Q492881) (← links)
• Computing equilibria of prediction markets via persuasion (Q776231) (← links)
• Games with incomplete information and uncertain payoff: from the perspective of uncertainty theory (Q780220) (← links)
• Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies (Q1178809) (← links)
• Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria (Q1677241) (← links)
• On the value of persuasion by experts (Q1701027) (← links)
• On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations (Q1729662) (← links)
• Pivotal persuasion (Q1729672) (← links)
• Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams (Q1753279) (← links)
• Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection (Q1995282) (← links)
• Creating confusion (Q1995296) (← links)
• The value of mediated communication (Q1995329) (← links)
• Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness (Q2013383) (← links)
• Common priors under endogenous uncertainty (Q2025045) (← links)
• Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information (Q2041069) (← links)
• Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information (Q2059074) (← links)
• Correlated equilibrium under costly disobedience (Q2070579) (← links)
• Informational robustness of common belief in rationality (Q2078102) (← links)
• Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games (Q2100097) (← links)
• A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection (Q2123176) (← links)
• Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure (Q2150659) (← links)
• On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals (Q2152112) (← links)
• The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition (Q2155249) (← links)
• Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design (Q2173101) (← links)
• Self-rejecting mechanisms (Q2178032) (← links)
• Information disclosure on the contest mechanism (Q2222221) (← links)
• Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion (Q2273949) (← links)
• On the hardness of designing public signals (Q2278949) (← links)
• Experimental design to persuade (Q2343397) (← links)
• Private Bayesian persuasion (Q2419595) (← links)
• Belief-invariant and quantum equilibria in games of incomplete information (Q2664942) (← links)
• Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform (Q2675452) (← links)
• Global manipulation by local obfuscation (Q2682790) (← links)
• Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent (Q4612466) (← links)
• Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion (Q4997315) (← links)
• Interactive Information Design (Q5076695) (← links)
• Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and Cores (Q5106369) (← links)
• Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues (Q5129202) (← links)
• Optimal Signaling of Content Accuracy: Engagement vs. Misinformation (Q5131472) (← links)
• A geometric Blackwell's order (Q6047327) (← links)
• Public Bayesian persuasion: being almost optimal and almost persuasive (Q6053476) (← links)
• Long information design (Q6059533) (← links)
• Value‐based distance between information structures (Q6059548) (← links)
• Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms (Q6072236) (← links)
• Unrestricted information acquisition (Q6076919) (← links)
• Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents (Q6076924) (← links)
• Stable outcomes and information in games: an empirical framework (Q6090549) (← links)
• Mechanism design with informational punishment (Q6102577) (← links)
• Optimal stress tests and liquidation cost (Q6106632) (← links)