Pages that link to "Item:Q4586044"
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The following pages link to Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability (Q4586044):
Displaying 12 items.
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property (Q1753301) (← links)
- Strategy-proof location of public facilities (Q1756325) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable (Q2002070) (← links)
- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals (Q2021810) (← links)
- Manipulability in school choice (Q2231403) (← links)
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules (Q2417386) (← links)
- On the implementation of the median (Q2668985) (← links)
- Criteria to compare mechanisms that partially satisfy a property: an axiomatic study (Q2673787) (← links)
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents (Q6076915) (← links)
- Robustness to manipulations in school choice (Q6570723) (← links)
- Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Q6589391) (← links)
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule (Q6604768) (← links)
