Pages that link to "Item:Q4615852"
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The following pages link to Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control (Q4615852):
Displaying 13 items.
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions (Q281343) (← links)
- Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach (Q308656) (← links)
- How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls? (Q500551) (← links)
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences (Q682485) (← links)
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences (Q785519) (← links)
- Equilibrium and matching under price controls (Q1622357) (← links)
- Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments (Q1627001) (← links)
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions (Q1691348) (← links)
- The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach (Q1735792) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule (Q1753294) (← links)
- Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets (Q2025051) (← links)
- Overlapping multiple object assignments (Q2358791) (← links)
- Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts (Q6203356) (← links)
