Pages that link to "Item:Q4682760"
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The following pages link to Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources (Q4682760):
Displaying 50 items.
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles (Q372362) (← links)
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects (Q449183) (← links)
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles (Q496872) (← links)
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets (Q498757) (← links)
- On the operation of multiple matching markets (Q516981) (← links)
- Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents (Q682470) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects (Q722621) (← links)
- Influence in private-goods allocation (Q776963) (← links)
- Which is the fairest allocation in the max-min fairness-based coalitional game? (Q820567) (← links)
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values (Q896937) (← links)
- Centralized allocation in multiple markets (Q898664) (← links)
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application (Q1633670) (← links)
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities (Q1691346) (← links)
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation (Q1792571) (← links)
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences (Q1995476) (← links)
- Random assignments and outside options (Q2058870) (← links)
- Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects (Q2078057) (← links)
- Strategy-proof popular mechanisms (Q2092775) (← links)
- Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets (Q2138369) (← links)
- Trading probabilities along cycles (Q2138374) (← links)
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked (Q2155231) (← links)
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2173093) (← links)
- A market design approach to job rotation (Q2178013) (← links)
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms (Q2178581) (← links)
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model (Q2205990) (← links)
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses (Q2222205) (← links)
- Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange (Q2247951) (← links)
- Matching with restricted trade (Q2329419) (← links)
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants (Q2334138) (← links)
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure (Q2338670) (← links)
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms (Q2359384) (← links)
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments (Q2409677) (← links)
- Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information (Q2424242) (← links)
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects (Q2444698) (← links)
- The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
- Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange (Q2447169) (← links)
- Menu mechanisms (Q2675411) (← links)
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints (Q2680800) (← links)
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option (Q2681500) (← links)
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities (Q4612461) (← links)
- Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only (Q5108269) (← links)
- New axioms for top trading cycles (Q6066263) (← links)
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification (Q6076910) (← links)
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation (Q6090447) (← links)
- Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof (Q6117767) (← links)
- On two mechanisms in job rotation problems (Q6121898) (← links)
- Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints (Q6145529) (← links)
- Stability of an allocation of objects (Q6156320) (← links)
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources (Q6156321) (← links)
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model (Q6156325) (← links)