Pages that link to "Item:Q472219"
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The following pages link to A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea (Q472219):
Displaying 20 items.
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods (Q682480) (← links)
- Influence in private-goods allocation (Q776963) (← links)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application (Q826044) (← links)
- Epsilon-stability in school choice (Q1697834) (← links)
- Fair student placement (Q1706794) (← links)
- A marriage matching mechanism menagerie (Q1727951) (← links)
- Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution (Q1748535) (← links)
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice (Q1787522) (← links)
- School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution (Q1996170) (← links)
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2041080) (← links)
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities (Q2051512) (← links)
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice (Q2061119) (← links)
- Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice (Q2095270) (← links)
- Essentially stable matchings (Q2178028) (← links)
- Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution'' (Q2327849) (← links)
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings (Q5095181) (← links)
- New axioms for top trading cycles (Q6066263) (← links)
- School choice with transferable student characteristics (Q6148575) (← links)
- The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice (Q6176756) (← links)
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems (Q6188681) (← links)
