The following pages link to Andrés Perea (Q480851):
Displaying 45 items.
- Utility proportional beliefs (Q480852) (← links)
- An algorithm for proper rationalizability (Q550196) (← links)
- Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining (Q557959) (← links)
- Strategic disclosure of random variables (Q617521) (← links)
- The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion (Q631121) (← links)
- Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion (Q712470) (← links)
- When do types induce the same belief hierarchy? (Q725041) (← links)
- (Q857569) (redirect page) (← links)
- Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games (Q857571) (← links)
- Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games (Q868610) (← links)
- Commitment in alternating offers bargaining (Q898750) (← links)
- Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction (Q931782) (← links)
- Repeated games with voluntary information purchase (Q1021588) (← links)
- A model of minimal probabilistic belief revision (Q1036100) (← links)
- Supporting others and the evolution of influence. (Q1603790) (← links)
- Common belief in approximate rationality (Q1650264) (← links)
- Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem (Q1651228) (← links)
- A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games (Q1864819) (← links)
- Limited focus in dynamic games (Q2002069) (← links)
- A new epistemic characterization of \(\varepsilon\)-proper rationalizability (Q2013350) (← links)
- Common belief in future and restricted past rationality (Q2021823) (← links)
- Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness (Q2082778) (← links)
- Introduction to the special Section on logic and the foundations of game and decision theory (LOFT12) (Q2098954) (← links)
- Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning (Q2138377) (← links)
- Two definitions of correlated equilibrium (Q2201694) (← links)
- On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability (Q2259412) (← links)
- Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games (Q2280049) (← links)
- Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality (Q2292734) (← links)
- Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning (Q2344936) (← links)
- On loss aversion in bimatrix games (Q2380520) (← links)
- Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs (Q2397645) (← links)
- An epistemic approach to stochastic games (Q2424241) (← links)
- Belief in the opponents' future rationality (Q2437178) (← links)
- Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games (Q2455676) (← links)
- A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies (Q2460189) (← links)
- Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility (Q2462292) (← links)
- The weak sequential core for two-period economies (Q2491088) (← links)
- Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games (Q2577439) (← links)
- Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs (Q2637845) (← links)
- Finite Reasoning Procedures for Dynamic Games (Q2817408) (← links)
- A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value (Q2867523) (← links)
- (Q3574470) (← links)
- Optimal search for a moving target with the option to wait (Q5187932) (← links)
- FROM CLASSICAL TO EPISTEMIC GAME THEORY (Q5406291) (← links)
- CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES (Q5694438) (← links)
