Pages that link to "Item:Q5058194"
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The following pages link to The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence (Q5058194):
Displaying 12 items.
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market (Q2100651) (← links)
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment (Q2138086) (← links)
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option (Q2681500) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms (Q6074836) (← links)
- Non-vetoed matching with status quo (Q6121906) (← links)
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf (Q6121908) (← links)
- CATCHMENT AREAS, STRATIFICATION, AND ACCESS TO BETTER SCHOOLS (Q6122165) (← links)
- The law of large numbers for large stable matchings (Q6554216) (← links)
- Top trading cycles (Q6559462) (← links)
- Minimal farsighted instability (Q6581886) (← links)
- (Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms (Q6596162) (← links)
- Reallocation mechanisms under distributional constraints in the full preference domain (Q6609180) (← links)
