Pages that link to "Item:Q5225243"

The following pages link to Stable Matching in Large Economies (Q5225243):

Displaying 10 items.

• Epsilon-stability in school choice (Q1697834) (← links)
• Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects (Q2002068) (← links)
• Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies (Q2019341) (← links)
• Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools (Q2173082) (← links)
• Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach (Q2222218) (← links)
• On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice (Q2318120) (← links)
• Household formation and markets (Q2354541) (← links)
• Stable Matching in Large Economies (Q5225243) (← links)
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems (Q6039790) (← links)
• Stable matching: An integer programming approach (Q6053647) (← links)