Pages that link to "Item:Q5475027"

The following pages link to Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (Q5475027):

Displaying 50 items.

• On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization (Q324146) (← links)
• Conditional exact law of large numbers and asymmetric information economies with aggregate uncertainty (Q324340) (← links)
• Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium (Q380882) (← links)
• On the space of players in idealized limit games (Q406390) (← links)
• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring (Q406393) (← links)
• A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems (Q522999) (← links)
• On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium (Q532656) (← links)
• Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents (Q617679) (← links)
• Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies (Q632974) (← links)
• Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies (Q825168) (← links)
• Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players (Q894065) (← links)
• Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game (Q899678) (← links)
• Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility (Q926232) (← links)
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus (Q928879) (← links)
• Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty (Q1001836) (← links)
• Existence of Edgeworth equilibria for economies with asymmetric information (Q1003121) (← links)
• Aggregation of expert opinions (Q1007768) (← links)
• The incentive compatible coarse core when information is almost complete. (Q1395000) (← links)
• Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information. (Q1413220) (← links)
• Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty. (Q1416504) (← links)
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility (Q1622382) (← links)
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets (Q1622384) (← links)
• Large strategic dynamic interactions (Q1622439) (← links)
• Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide (Q1650274) (← links)
• Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality (Q1751281) (← links)
• College assignment as a large contest (Q1753683) (← links)
• Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents (Q1757591) (← links)
• Core convergence with asymmetric information (Q1779839) (← links)
• Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations (Q1995474) (← links)
• On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games (Q2078075) (← links)
• Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms (Q2138074) (← links)
• Robust perfect equilibrium in large games (Q2138076) (← links)
• The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution (Q2211473) (← links)
• Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary (Q2211494) (← links)
• Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces (Q2324797) (← links)
• A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium (Q2345213) (← links)
• Mechanism design with information acquisition (Q2358793) (← links)
• Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge (Q2363423) (← links)
• Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives (Q2373772) (← links)
• Deliberative voting (Q2373777) (← links)
• Equilibria and incentives in private information economies (Q2397644) (← links)
• Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions (Q2434233) (← links)
• Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies (Q2460834) (← links)
• Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies (Q2463788) (← links)
• The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information (Q2469850) (← links)
• Dynamic yardstick mechanisms (Q2491877) (← links)
• Asset market equilibrium with short-selling and differential information (Q2642874) (← links)
• Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu (Q2673687) (← links)
• COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS (Q2854008) (← links)
• Shortest path network interdiction with asymmetric information (Q3184598) (← links)