Pages that link to "Item:Q5475030"

The following pages link to Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities (Q5475030):

Displaying 50 items.

• Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics (Q290170) (← links)
• Responsive affirmative action in school choice (Q308606) (← links)
• Local and global consistency properties for student placement (Q386062) (← links)
• Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods (Q402062) (← links)
• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment (Q402069) (← links)
• Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare (Q423772) (← links)
• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods (Q431227) (← links)
• When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof? (Q459157) (← links)
• A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea (Q472219) (← links)
• Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems (Q477777) (← links)
• On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (Q485776) (← links)
• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints (Q508390) (← links)
• On the operation of multiple matching markets (Q516981) (← links)
• Decentralized job matching (Q532508) (← links)
• Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems (Q532646) (← links)
• On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable (Q656783) (← links)
• Sticky matching in school choice (Q683828) (← links)
• Constrained school choice (Q840677) (← links)
• Consistent house allocation (Q868626) (← links)
• Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources (Q900413) (← links)
• Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures (Q944257) (← links)
• Efficient assignment respecting priorities (Q972883) (← links)
• Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability (Q1021616) (← links)
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof (Q1622367) (← links)
• Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted (Q1642176) (← links)
• Mutually best matches (Q1650271) (← links)
• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities (Q1691346) (← links)
• Epsilon-stability in school choice (Q1697834) (← links)
• Fair student placement (Q1706794) (← links)
• Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation (Q1753433) (← links)
• Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas (Q1757561) (← links)
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420) (← links)
• Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations (Q1996172) (← links)
• Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities (Q2013344) (← links)
• Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (Q2021788) (← links)
• Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand (Q2036905) (← links)
• Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems (Q2044987) (← links)
• On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms (Q2060531) (← links)
• Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice (Q2061119) (← links)
• Gradual college admission (Q2067380) (← links)
• College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion (Q2099060) (← links)
• Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade (Q2108764) (← links)
• When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? (Q2125094) (← links)
• Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts (Q2128949) (← links)
• On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2173093) (← links)
• Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions (Q2206795) (← links)
• Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses (Q2222205) (← links)
• Manipulability in school choice (Q2231403) (← links)
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility (Q2273939) (← links)
• Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago (Q2278933) (← links)