Pages that link to "Item:Q5687758"
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The following pages link to A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates (Q5687758):
Displaying 50 items.
- Divergent platforms (Q272147) (← links)
- Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint (Q343116) (← links)
- Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model (Q404775) (← links)
- The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections (Q412081) (← links)
- Condorcet winners on median spaces (Q483121) (← links)
- Cycles in public opinion and the dynamics of stable party systems (Q517009) (← links)
- Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse (Q523481) (← links)
- Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy (Q537539) (← links)
- A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters (Q537551) (← links)
- Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties (Q622568) (← links)
- Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law (Q682489) (← links)
- The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting (Q765204) (← links)
- Approval voting with endogenous candidates (Q817266) (← links)
- A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups (Q839615) (← links)
- Private polling in elections and voter welfare (Q840682) (← links)
- Can the majority lose the election? (Q843740) (← links)
- Candidate stability and voting correspondences (Q857970) (← links)
- Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates (Q864884) (← links)
- Endogenous platforms: the case of many parties (Q869238) (← links)
- Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule (Q869240) (← links)
- The binary policy model (Q969124) (← links)
- A model of political competition with activists applied to the elections of 1989 and 1995 in Argentina (Q997200) (← links)
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? (Q1007330) (← links)
- Moderation of an ideological party (Q1007775) (← links)
- Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections (Q1036097) (← links)
- Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions (Q1036585) (← links)
- A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy. (Q1420511) (← links)
- Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates (Q1575091) (← links)
- Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy (Q1599833) (← links)
- Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy? (Q1735766) (← links)
- A model of political parties (Q1876654) (← links)
- A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection (Q1950346) (← links)
- Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules (Q2013365) (← links)
- On the political economy of compulsory education (Q2058505) (← links)
- Reaching across the aisle to block reforms (Q2059072) (← links)
- Party formation and coalitional bargaining in a model of proportional representation (Q2091703) (← links)
- Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate? (Q2091712) (← links)
- Inequality, poverty and the composition of redistribution (Q2103593) (← links)
- The political economy of early COVID-19 interventions in US states (Q2152363) (← links)
- Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert-Wittman model (Q2157287) (← links)
- Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory (Q2178642) (← links)
- Representative voting games (Q2235084) (← links)
- Strategic voting and nomination (Q2247944) (← links)
- A model of pre-electoral coalition formation (Q2278939) (← links)
- Ideological extremism and primaries (Q2308798) (← links)
- Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections (Q2359398) (← links)
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment (Q2385062) (← links)
- Citizen candidates under uncertainty (Q2385066) (← links)
- Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning (Q2385116) (← links)
- A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit (Q2427135) (← links)
