The following pages link to (Q5704417):
Displaying 38 items.
- On doxastic justification and properly basing one's beliefs (Q320168) (← links)
- Quantum probabilities and the conjunction principle (Q408350) (← links)
- A graded Bayesian coherence notion (Q488471) (← links)
- Measuring the overall incoherence of credence functions (Q514110) (← links)
- Ideal rationality and logical omniscience (Q514606) (← links)
- Belief without credence (Q516321) (← links)
- Eliciting uncertainties: a two structure approach (Q1653656) (← links)
- Dutch books and nonclassical probability spaces (Q1705363) (← links)
- Fallibilism, verisimilitude, and the preface paradox (Q1706785) (← links)
- The fragility of common knowledge (Q1706804) (← links)
- The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments (Q1708774) (← links)
- Vague credence (Q1708891) (← links)
- A defense of temperate epistemic transparency (Q1929757) (← links)
- Deductive cogency, understanding, and acceptance (Q1989991) (← links)
- Two approaches to belief revision (Q2051124) (← links)
- A bitter pill for closure (Q2053981) (← links)
- Bounded rationality and control (Q2171739) (← links)
- The fundamental problem of logical omniscience (Q2194114) (← links)
- On de Finetti's instrumentalist philosophy of probability (Q2289724) (← links)
- Belief and contextual acceptance (Q2430814) (← links)
- Epistemic closure under deductive inference: what is it and can we afford it? (Q2443329) (← links)
- Calibrated probabilities and the epistemology of disagreement (Q2446057) (← links)
- What are degrees of belief? (Q2454643) (← links)
- Attitudes toward epistemic risk and the value of experiments (Q2454644) (← links)
- On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance (Q2515782) (← links)
- Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes (Q2690150) (← links)
- Belief, credence, and evidence (Q2690157) (← links)
- Credence as doxastic tendency (Q2690184) (← links)
- Betting against the Zen monk: on preferences and partial belief (Q2695167) (← links)
- <i>Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat</i> (Q2867861) (← links)
- Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief (Q2965385) (← links)
- (Q5086469) (← links)
- Is Quantum Mechanics a New Theory of Probability? (Q5119667) (← links)
- How can necessary facts call for explanation? (Q6088510) (← links)
- Ought-contextualism and reasoning (Q6142470) (← links)
- Assertions and future tense semantics (Q6142507) (← links)
- Context-sensitivity and the preface paradox for credence (Q6147158) (← links)
- Modus ponens and the logic of decision (Q6156207) (← links)
