The following pages link to STACS 2005 (Q5710720):
Displaying 20 items.
- Approximate composable truthful mechanism design (Q344791) (← links)
- Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines (Q635328) (← links)
- Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines (Q861258) (← links)
- A monotone approximation algorithm for scheduling with precedence constraints (Q935240) (← links)
- The power of verification for one-parameter agents (Q1004286) (← links)
- Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification (Q1006066) (← links)
- Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling (Q1019737) (← links)
- Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines (Q1026241) (← links)
- A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms (Q1031874) (← links)
- On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks (Q1041343) (← links)
- A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms (Q1949759) (← links)
- Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification (Q2016253) (← links)
- Multistage interval scheduling games (Q2283299) (← links)
- Approximations and auctions for scheduling batches on related machines (Q2643820) (← links)
- Truthfulness for the Sum of Weighted Completion Times (Q2817845) (← links)
- Approximate Truthful Mechanism Design for Two-Dimensional Orthogonal Knapsack Problem (Q3196401) (← links)
- A General Scheme for Designing Monotone Algorithms for Scheduling Problems with Precedence Constraints (Q3602833) (← links)
- Preemptive Scheduling on Selfish Machines (Q5458506) (← links)
- Maximizing the Minimum Load for Selfish Agents (Q5458534) (← links)
- Well-behaved online load balancing against strategic jobs (Q6090218) (← links)
