The following pages link to (Q5879170):
Displaying 24 items.
- On the complexity of reasoning about opinion diffusion under majority dynamics (Q785234) (← links)
- Optimal majority dynamics for the diffusion of an opinion when multiple alternatives are available (Q831148) (← links)
- Predicting voting outcomes in the presence of communities, echo chambers and multiple parties (Q2093374) (← links)
- Exploiting social influence to control elections based on positional scoring rules (Q2105422) (← links)
- Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota (Q2169970) (← links)
- Weighted representative democracy (Q2178584) (← links)
- Minimal envy and popular matchings (Q2242327) (← links)
- Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods (Q2289012) (← links)
- Empathetic decision making in social networks (Q2321326) (← links)
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules (Q2334861) (← links)
- Funding public projects: a case for the Nash product rule (Q2668980) (← links)
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints (Q2675446) (← links)
- Portioning using ordinal preferences: fairness and efficiency (Q2680774) (← links)
- Measuring nearly single-peakedness of an electorate: some new insights (Q2695423) (← links)
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions (Q5076342) (← links)
- (Q5874477) (← links)
- Balanced stable marriage: how close is close enough? (Q5918373) (← links)
- Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions (Q6051889) (← links)
- On manipulation in merging epistemic states (Q6099553) (← links)
- Apportionment with parity constraints (Q6120934) (← links)
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list (Q6124592) (← links)
- Popular matchings with weighted voters (Q6494270) (← links)
- Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting (Q6494745) (← links)
- Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively separable hedonic games (Q6592981) (← links)
