Pages that link to "Item:Q5964688"

The following pages link to Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems (Q5964688):

Displaying 8 items.

• Fractional matching markets (Q516999) (← links)
• A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q1753688) (← links)
• Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching (Q2002058) (← links)
• Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets (Q2078071) (← links)
• Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities (Q2212739) (← links)
• Stable fractional matchings (Q2238635) (← links)
• Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts (Q2325654) (← links)
• The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints (Q2675446) (← links)