The following pages link to Self-selection consistent functions (Q697836):
Displaying 18 items.
- Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities (Q393271) (← links)
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient? (Q423715) (← links)
- The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks (Q431804) (← links)
- An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules (Q449045) (← links)
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (Q492810) (← links)
- On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules (Q517007) (← links)
- Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities (Q665078) (← links)
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names (Q930481) (← links)
- Self-selective social choice functions (Q930487) (← links)
- Efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities (Q936635) (← links)
- On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules (Q993505) (← links)
- Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules. (Q1399521) (← links)
- Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle (Q2088903) (← links)
- Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains (Q2417401) (← links)
- Consistent representative democracy (Q2427119) (← links)
- Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules (Q2453403) (← links)
- Locating public facilities by majority: stability, consistency and group formation (Q2466867) (← links)
- Condorcet winner configurations of linear networks (Q3577841) (← links)
