The following pages link to Ronald M. Harstad (Q702150):
Displaying 18 items.
- Experimental methods and elicitation of values (Q702151) (← links)
- The welfare cost of signaling (Q725093) (← links)
- Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions (Q899767) (← links)
- On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions (Q1333560) (← links)
- Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders (Q1676708) (← links)
- Private information revelation in common-value auctions (Q1812177) (← links)
- Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions (Q1896697) (← links)
- Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly (Q2373375) (← links)
- Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders (Q2427126) (← links)
- Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions (Q2784019) (← links)
- Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly? (Q3114828) (← links)
- An “Alternating Recognition” Model of English Auctions (Q3116717) (← links)
- (Q3354621) (← links)
- (Q3354622) (← links)
- Expected-Utility-Maximizing Price Search with Learning (Q3927013) (← links)
- (Q4352341) (← links)
- Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance (Q4887722) (← links)
- A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions (Q5187107) (← links)
