The following pages link to Umut Mert Dur (Q826611):
Displaying 21 items.
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets (Q826612) (← links)
- (Q1651276) (redirect page) (← links)
- Competitive equilibria in school assignment (Q1651277) (← links)
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability (Q1668291) (← links)
- Incompatibility between stability and consistency (Q1672771) (← links)
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab (Q2067353) (← links)
- Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools (Q2173082) (← links)
- What you don't know can help you in school assignment (Q2178019) (← links)
- Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications (Q2323297) (← links)
- The modified Boston mechanism (Q2334829) (← links)
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (Q2402812) (← links)
- School choice with neighbors (Q2425195) (← links)
- Family ties: School assignment with siblings (Q5087339) (← links)
- School choice under partial fairness (Q5121481) (← links)
- Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves (Q6146437) (← links)
- Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system (Q6575508) (← links)
- A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem (Q6575517) (← links)
- Rawlsian matching (Q6575518) (← links)
- Capacity design in school choice (Q6584598) (← links)
- Sequential school choice with public and private schools (Q6624508) (← links)
- Partitionable choice functions and stability (Q6624514) (← links)
