The following pages link to Eric Kamwa (Q898671):
Displaying 9 items.
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes (Q898672) (← links)
- Coincidence of Condorcet committees (Q1707115) (← links)
- Book review of: P. Serafini, Mathematics to the rescue of democracy. What does voting mean and how can it be improved? (Q2066678) (← links)
- Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser (Q2329162) (← links)
- On stable rules for selecting committees (Q2358564) (← links)
- On the Fishburn social choice function (Q4584755) (← links)
- Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention (Q5053686) (← links)
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems (Q5053696) (← links)
- Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures (Q6637497) (← links)
