Pages that link to "Item:Q932763"

The following pages link to The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible (Q932763):

Displaying 10 items.

• On the operation of multiple matching markets (Q516981) (← links)
• A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets (Q533919) (← links)
• Centralized allocation in multiple markets (Q898664) (← links)
• Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences (Q2025006) (← links)
• Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market (Q2100651) (← links)
• On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals (Q2318132) (← links)
• Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability (Q2347998) (← links)
• Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities (Q2434962) (← links)
• Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems (Q6074889) (← links)
• Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles (Q6176732) (← links)