Pages that link to "Item:Q960279"

The following pages link to Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion (Q960279):

Displaying 13 items.

• Dynamic strategic information transmission (Q402084) (← links)
• The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence (Q516968) (← links)
• Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences (Q1025630) (← links)
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games (Q1691374) (← links)
• Communication with evidence in the lab (Q1756334) (← links)
• Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission (Q1939516) (← links)
• False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad (Q1985730) (← links)
• Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes (Q2280048) (← links)
• Strategic communication with reporting costs (Q2329164) (← links)
• How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence (Q2430003) (← links)
• A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions (Q2444685) (← links)
• Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence (Q2457238) (← links)
• Persuasion with communication costs (Q2516228) (← links)