Pages that link to "Item:Q972135"
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The following pages link to The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) (Q972135):
Displaying 9 items.
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets (Q404743) (← links)
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching (Q485428) (← links)
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching (Q1651221) (← links)
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets (Q1684134) (← links)
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (Q1926598) (← links)
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2041080) (← links)
- Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies (Q2098899) (← links)
- The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically (Q2363424) (← links)
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (Q2437848) (← links)
