Stochastic stability in finitely repeated two player games

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1686MaRDI QIDQ2867462zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jack Robles

Publication date 19 December 2013

Published in The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1686

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionrepeated gamesstochastic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cited in

(8)

• Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
• Effects of players' random participation to the stability in LQ games
• A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
• Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences
• Reversibility and oscillations in zero-sum discounted stochastic games
• Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games
• Evolution, investment, and bargaining
• Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games

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