Stochastic stability in three-player games
From MaRDI portal
Abstract: Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only recently evolutionarily stable strategies were defined for multi-player games and their properties analyzed (Broom et al., 1997). Here we study the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of populations of randomly matched individuals playing symmetric three-player games. We analyze stochastic stability of equilibria in games with multiple evolutionarily stable strategies. We also show that in some games, a population may not evolve in the long run to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.
Recommendations
- Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games
- Stochastic stability in spatial games
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: foundations, deterministic approximation, and equilibrium selection
- Evolutionary stochastic games
- Dynamic stability of the set of Nash equilibria in stable stochastic games
Cited in
(20)- Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games
- Evolution of populations playing mixed multiplayer games
- Strange attractors and nontrivial solutions in games with three players
- Evolutionary multiplayer games
- Stochastic stability in three-player games with time delays
- Stochastic stability in spatial games
- Stochastic stability in spatial games
- Multiple-trial conflicts and stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2202835 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2205562 (Why is no real title available?)
- Dynamics of three-agent games
- Three-player game-theoretic allocation of indivisible resources during natural disasters
- Fixation probabilities of strategies for trimatrix games and their applications to triadic conflict
- Random multi-player games
- Stochasticity and time delays in evolutionary games
- Fictitious play in 3 3 games: chaos and dithering behaviour
- Chris Cannings: a life in games
- Three-player games with strategy-dependent time delays
- Analysis and shifting of stochastically stable equilibria for evolutionary snowdrift games
This page was built for publication: Stochastic stability in three-player games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q263540)