Strategic Opinion Manipulation in Multiplex Networks

DOI10.48550/arXiv.2609.22524MaRDI QIDQ7353498arXivFDO

Authors Massimo Franceschetti, Raman Ebrahimi

Publication date 18 September 2026

Published in arXiv

Tldr This paper proposes a model of opinion manipulation in multiplex networks where agents strategically report different opinions on each layer to influence the merged consensus. We show that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium and derive an expression for the resulting distortion, highlighting how attention weights and manipulability indices affect the platform's robustness to strategic manipulation.

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.22524

arXiv classification

cs.GTcs.SI

Cites work

• Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• How bad is forming your own opinion?
• Incentive compatible regression learning
• Mathematical Formulation of Multi-Layer Networks
• Opinion dynamics in social networks with stubborn agents: equilibrium and convergence rate
• Opinion fluctuations and disagreement in social networks
• Reaching a Consensus
• Strategic classification
• Strategic communication with lying costs
• Strategic information transmission networks
• Strategy-proof estimators for simple regression.
• Targeting Interventions in Networks
• Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player

This page was built for publication: Strategic Opinion Manipulation in Multiplex Networks

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7353498)