Strategic commitment to forgo information: evidence from the lab

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2025.01.007MaRDI QIDQ7009273zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Emanuel Kandel, Eyal Winter

Publication date 20 March 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2025.01.007

zbMATH Keywords

forgoing informationgamesinteractive decision-makingstrategic commitmentvalue of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites work

• Ability and knowledge
• An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Commitment games
• Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
• On the Concept of the Value of Information in Competitive Situations
• On the value of information in a strategic conflict
• Positive value of information in games
• Rule rationality
• Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• The positive value of information

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