Strategic interlocking cross-ownership

DOI10.1007/S00712-026-00923-7MaRDI QIDQ7315562zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti, Luca Gori

Publication date 18 August 2026

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00712-026-00923-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites work

• A tale of two networks: common ownership and product market rivalry
• Capital-labor substitution and competitive nonlinear endogenous business cycles
• Choosing price or quantity? The role of delegation and network externalities
• Cross-ownership in network industries: when less competition implies less profits or more social welfare
• Interlocking cross-ownership in a unionised duopoly: when social welfare benefits from ``more collusion
• International cross-ownership of firms and strategic privatization policy
• On the microeconomic foundations of linear demand for differentiated products
• Ownership relations in the presence of cross-shareholding
• Product quality and product compatibility in network industries
• Strategic delegation under price competition and network effects
• Strategic product compatibility in network industries
• The perpetual trouble with network products why it firms choose partial compatibility
• The rise of market power and the macroeconomic implications

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