Subjective probabilities need not be sharp
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6009887 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48344 (Why is no real title available?)
- A survey of the theory of coherent lower previsions
- Decision making under uncertainty using imprecise probabilities
- Dilation for sets of probabilities
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity
- Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
- The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
Cited in
(15)- A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability
- Imprecise probabilities and unstable betting behaviour
- You've come a long way, Bayesians
- Acting on belief functions
- How to be imprecise and yet immune to sure loss
- On the imprecision of full conditional probabilities
- Subjective causal networks and indeterminate suppositional credences
- Decisions without sharp probabilities
- Tracking probabilistic truths: a logic for statistical learning
- Uncertainty, equality, fraternity
- A gentle approach to imprecise probability
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450019 (Why is no real title available?)
- A dilemma for the imprecise Bayesian
- Vague credence
- Who is Afraid of Subjective Probability?
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