The concept of truth
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Abstract: On the basis of elementary thinking about language functioning, a solution of truth paradoxes is given and a corresponding semantics of a truth predicate is founded. It is shown that it is precisely the two-valued description of the maximal intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three-valued semantics.
The author explains -- first informally, later on more formally -- his solution of paradoxes like (Strong) Liar and Truthteller via distinguishing between ``primary semantics and ``final semantics. The resulting semantics of a truth predicate is shown to be the two-valued description of the maximal intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three-valued semantics.
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