The effects of separability on incentive-based instrument performance

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00048-8MaRDI QIDQ1292358zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kurt A. Schwabe

Publication date 21 June 1999

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

separabilitypollution abatementcommand and control strategiesincentive-based instruments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• Specific Taxes and the Control of Pollution: A General Equilibrium Analysis
• The Constant Elasticity of Transformation Production Frontier and Linear Supply System

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