The rationalist conception of logic

DOI10.1305/NDJFL/1093636843MaRDI QIDQ1097247zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven J. Wagner

Publication date 1987

Published in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1093636843

zbMATH Keywords

Fregenaturalistic epistemologysecond order logic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Review text

The paper argues that first order logic can justly be called logic, whilst second order and similar logics cannot. The argument turns crucially on the recursive enumerability of first order logic, and the significance of this for the epistemological role of logic. Frege's notion of this epistemological role is endorsed; but the notion of knowledge advocated is a sociological one, and thus quite unFregean.

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Cited in

(4)

• The logic of finite order
• Logic as instrument: the millian view on the role of logic
• First-order logic: (philosophical) pro and contra
• Reassessing logical hylomorphism and the demarcation of logical constants

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