The strongly stable roommates problem

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.ESA.2016.60MaRDI QIDQ4606332zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Adam Kunysz

Publication date 2 March 2018

Full work available at URL http://dx.doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2016.60

zbMATH Keywords

matching theoryrotationsstable roommatesstrongly stable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Graph algorithms (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C85) Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• The Stable Roommates Problem with Ties
• Characterisation of strongly stable matchings
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Cited in

(24)

• The stable roommates problem with choice functions
• The roommate problem with externalities
• Exchange-stability in roommate problems
• A faster algorithm for the Strongly Stable b-Matching Problem
• The stable fixtures problem -- a many-to-many extension of stable roommates
• The Stable Roommates Problem with Short Lists
• Strongly stable matchings in time \(O(nm)\) and extension to the hospitals-residents problem
• The Stable Roommates Problem with Ties
• Acyclic roommates
• Strongly stable assignment
• The Structure of the Stable Roommate Problem: Efficient Representation and Enumeration of All Stable Assignments
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1962834 (Why is no real title available?)
• Characterisation of strongly stable matchings
• An algorithm for the maximum weight strongly stable matching problem
• A General Framework for Stable Roommates Problems using Answer Set Programming
• STACS 2004
• Stable Roommates and Constraint Programming
• Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
• A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms
• Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
• Adapting stable matchings to forced and forbidden pairs
• Effective data reduction for strongly stable matching in very sparse graphs
• The ``stable roommates problem with random preferences
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stability and internal closedness in matching theory

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