Transmission arguments against knowledge closure are still fallacious

DOI10.1007/S11229-014-0403-8MaRDI QIDQ2263039zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tim Kraft

Publication date 17 March 2015

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0403-8

zbMATH Keywords

closureknowledgetransmission arguments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Recommendations

• Towards closure on closure
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Cites work

• A strategy for assessing closure
• Epistemic closure and epistemic logic. I: Relevant alternatives and subjunctivism
• When does epistemic closure fail?
• When epistemic closure does and does not fail: a lesson from the history of epistemology

Cited in

(4)

• When does epistemic closure fail?
• Hinge commitments vis-à-vis the transmission problem
• The Bayesian explanation of transmission failure
• Towards closure on closure

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