Truth and assertability
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This short paper argues against typical deflationary accounts of truth, in terms of which the meaning of `true' is given by its acceptance conditions, by bringing out well-known weaknesses of that account. It suggests that a theory that gives the meaning of `true' in terms of assertability conditions, which allow for degrees of acceptance, like subjective probability, will fare better. This proposal too falls short. The paper concludes that deflationism is false.
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