Uncommon Knowledge in Multiparty Auctions

DOI10.1287/DECA.2022.0454MaRDI QIDQ5868906zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 26 September 2022

Published in Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2022.0454

zbMATH Keywords

adversarial risk analysisasymmetric auctionsBayesian methodsfirst-price auctionslevel \(k\) thinkingpure strategy Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• Adversarial risk analysis
• Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
• Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3539473 (Why is no real title available?)
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

Cited in

(1)

• Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs

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