Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-75254-7_29MaRDI QIDQ3527275zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Emmanuel Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin

Publication date 25 September 2008

Published in Multi-Agent Systems and Applications V (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75254-7_29

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of languages and software systems (knowledge-based systems, expert systems, etc.) for artificial intelligence (68T35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms
• Model checking auctions as artifact systems: decidability via finite abstraction
• Formal verification of e-auction protocols
• Computer-aided verification for mechanism design
• Complexity of Verifying Game Equilibria

Cited in

(6)

• Dominant strategy mechanisms for contract auctions with risk aversion and moral hazard
• Strictly strategy-proof auctions
• Rationality authority for provable rational behavior
• Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1966919 (Why is no real title available?)
• Model checking auctions as artifact systems: decidability via finite abstraction

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