Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-93920-7_13MaRDI QIDQ3601792zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Emmanuel Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto W. Vasconcelos

Publication date 12 February 2009

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-93920-7_13

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Specification and verification (program logics, model checking, etc.) (68Q60) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Internet topics (68M11)

Recommendations

• Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions
• Model checking auctions as artifact systems: decidability via finite abstraction
• Abstraction-based verification of infinite-state reactive modules
• Formal verification of e-auction protocols
• Computer-aided verification for mechanism design

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1617333 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1183297 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1446599 (Why is no real title available?)
• Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
• Computationally manageable combinational auctions
• Faster Scaling Algorithms for Network Problems
• Programming and Verifying Subgame-Perfect Mechanisms
• Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions

Cited in

(9)

• Double auctions: formalization and automated checkers
• Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions
• Bisimulations for verifying strategic abilities with an application to the ThreeBallot voting protocol
• A Qualitative Comparison of the Suitability of Four Theorem Provers for Basic Auction Theory
• Computer-aided verification for mechanism design
• Model checking auctions as artifact systems: decidability via finite abstraction
• Abstraction-based verification of infinite-state reactive modules
• An introduction to mechanized reasoning
• Strictly strategy-proof auctions

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• AgentSpeak
• SPIN

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