When managers cannot commit: capital structure under inalienable managerial entrenchment

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.11.006MaRDI QIDQ631268zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Catherine Thomas, Yongxiang Wang

Publication date 22 March 2011

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.006

zbMATH Keywords

bankruptcycommitmentdebtmanagerial entrenchment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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