Why Do Mathematicians Re-prove Theorems?

DOI10.1093/PHILMAT/NKL009MaRDI QIDQ5292214zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John W. jun. Dawson

Publication date 19 June 2007

Published in Philosophia Mathematica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkl009

zbMATH Keywords

methodology of mathematicsphilosophy of mathematics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Methodology of mathematics (00A35)

Cited in

(14)

• Unificatory understanding and explanatory proofs
• Cognitive development of proof
• The need for proof and proving: mathematical and pedagogical perspectives
• On the diagonal lemma of Gödel and Carnap
• Throwing some light on the vast darkness that is analysis: Niels Henrik Abel's critical revision and the concept of absolute convergence
• Proofs of the compactness theorem
• How to think about informal proofs
• The significance of relativistic computation for the philosophy of mathematics
• SZEMERÉDI’S THEOREM: AN EXPLORATION OF IMPURITY, EXPLANATION, AND CONTENT
• Ontological purity for formal proofs
• How to make (mathematical) assertions with directives
• The generic multiverse is not going away
• Purity and explanation: a systematic case study
• A formal characterization of semantic pollution of modal proof systems

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