Pages that link to "Item:Q800200"
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The following pages link to Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem (Q800200):
Displaying 37 items.
- Let them cheat! (Q423773) (← links)
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (Q485776) (← links)
- Stability with one-sided incomplete information (Q508409) (← links)
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems (Q521881) (← links)
- Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods (Q532728) (← links)
- A further note on the college admission game (Q662278) (← links)
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm (Q705854) (← links)
- Constrained school choice (Q840677) (← links)
- Matching markets under (in)complete information (Q894021) (← links)
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186) (← links)
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) (Q972135) (← links)
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (Q1077313) (← links)
- Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem (Q1178254) (← links)
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences (Q1191821) (← links)
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms (Q1338121) (← links)
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets (Q1371137) (← links)
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (Q1420524) (← links)
- A simple selling and buying procedure (Q1601457) (← links)
- Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists (Q1668286) (← links)
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment (Q1735739) (← links)
- Protective behavior in matching models (Q1804637) (← links)
- Non-cooperative matching games (Q1824573) (← links)
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (Q1926598) (← links)
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2041080) (← links)
- Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies (Q2098899) (← links)
- Bipartite choices (Q2105872) (← links)
- Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431838) (← links)
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (Q2437848) (← links)
- Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help? (Q2482676) (← links)
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules (Q2482680) (← links)
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets (Q2519489) (← links)
- Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter (Q2867466) (← links)
- DIVORCE AND THE OPTION VALUE OF MARITAL SEARCH (Q3612318) (← links)
- Stability and stabilisation of networked pairing problem via event-triggered control (Q5068986) (← links)
- Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
- Algorithmic Aspects of Equilibria of Stable Marriage Model with Complete Preference Lists (Q5232794) (← links)
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (Q6107369) (← links)
