Pages that link to "Item:Q800200"

The following pages link to Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem (Q800200):

Displaying 15 items.

• Let them cheat! (Q423773) (← links)
• On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (Q485776) (← links)
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information (Q508409) (← links)
• Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems (Q521881) (← links)
• Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods (Q532728) (← links)
• A further note on the college admission game (Q662278) (← links)
• In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm (Q705854) (← links)
• Constrained school choice (Q840677) (← links)
• Matching markets under (in)complete information (Q894021) (← links)
• Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186) (← links)
• The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) (Q972135) (← links)
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets (Q1371137) (← links)
• A simple selling and buying procedure (Q1601457) (← links)
• Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists (Q1668286) (← links)
• Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment (Q1735739) (← links)