Belief-based refinements in signalling games (Q1308805): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 20:16, 19 March 2024
scientific article
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English | Belief-based refinements in signalling games |
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Belief-based refinements in signalling games (English)
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10 December 1993
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There are many economic problems which, when modelled as games of incomplete information, give rise to many sequential equilibria, severely limiting the usefulness of the model. There has recently been a large literature devoted to ``refining'' the set of equilibria in order to reduce this multiplicity by restricting the set of admissible disequilibrium beliefs. This paper argues that the logical foundations of some refinements and the equilibria they focus on are problematic and, further, proposes an alternative refinement, undefeated equilibrium, that avoids the difficulties. We also provide an existence theorem covering a broad class of signalling games often studied in economics.
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games of incomplete information
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sequential equilibria
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refinement
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undefeated equilibrium
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signalling games
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