Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach (Q790025): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 01:06, 20 March 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach |
scientific article |
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Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach (English)
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1984
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The author gives a scheme for reducing tax evasion to an arbitrarily small level within a given enforcement budget. There are three groups, \(G_ l\) a small group with reasonable probability of being audited, \(G_ 2\), a large group with small probability of being audited, and \(G_ 3\) a (theoretically empty) group who are always audited. Audited individuals found truthful are put in \(G_ 1\) (unless they are already in \(G_ 3)\) otherwise they go to \(G_ 3\) if in \(G_ 2\) and to \(G_ 2\) if in \(G_ 1\). A stationary Nash equilibrium occurs with any sufficiently small discount rate.
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Markov chain
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auditing scheme
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tax avoidance
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tax evasion
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Audited individuals
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stationary Nash equilibrium
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